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ABSTRACT
We   provi de a novel   em pir i cal  analysi s of  t he Sout h Ko r ean econom y t hat   r eveals l arge 
vol um es of excess or ' unproduct i ve'  credit  since the l ate 1970s,  i ndi cati ng t hat  a
sizeable proport i on of tot al credit  wa s  u s e d  t o refi nance unprofi t able proj ects. Ou r  
f i ndi ngs  are consi stent  wi t h  t he  hypot heses of  ' overl endi ng'   and  ' overi nvest me n t ' ,   wh i ch 
ma y  r efl ect soft  budget  const r aint s and/ or mo r al hazard.  We  a r gue t hat  wh i l e these 
w eaknesses we r e not   on t hei r   ow n r esponsi bl e f or  t he f i nanci al  cri sis,  t hei r   i nt eracti on 
wi t h t he ri sks em anati ng fr om  capit al account  li berali sati on created fert i l e ground for 
f i nanci al  pani c. 
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1.   Introduct i on
The 1997 fi nanci al cri sis in Sout h K orea took t he econom i cs profession by surpri se. 
Af t er  all ,   not   so l ong  ago  t he  ma i n  f ocus  of  mo s t   studi es on  As i an econom i es,  i ncl udi ng 
Ko r ea, wa s  t he expl anati on of the ' mi r acle'  (e.g.  Wo r l d Bank,  1993;  Y oung,  1995;  
De me t r i ades and Luint el,  1996).   E njoyi ng grow t h rates of around 8%  for mo r e than 
t hree decades, Sout h K orea m anaged t o t r ansform i t self  f r om  a poor,  l argel y
agri cult ural,   count r y t o a buzzing export -ori ented i ndust r i ali sed state,  wi t h standards of 
l i vi ng com parable to t hose of m any w est ern nat i ons.   Equal l y i mp r essive t hi s w as 
achieved through m obi l i sati on of dom est i c resources, wi t h t he governm ent   cont r ol l ed 
banki ng system  in t he centr e of f i nanci ng excepti onal l y hi gh rates of capit al
accum ulati on,  wi t hout  signi f i cant budget  defi cit s or i nfl ati on rates (Par k and K i m,  
1994).
The r em arkabl e m acroeconom i c perf orm ance of Sout h K orea essenti all y rul es out   t he 
t r adit i onal  f undam ent al vi ew  of ' f i r st-generati on'  cri sis m odel s as a plausibl e
expl anati on of the Sout h K orean cri sis.  These m odels (e.g.  Kr ugm an,  1979) ascri be 
cri ses to m acroeconom i c imb a l ances, refl ected m ainl y i n l arge curr ent account  and 
f i scal  defi cit s.  Wh i l e t here i s som e evidence  of  a grow i ng  curr ent  account   defi cit   before 
t he cri sis - refl ecti ng a sl ow dow n i n export s due t o t he cont r acti on of the Japanese 
econom y,   t he appreciati on of  t he exchange r ate and t he coll apse of  t he wo r l d pri ce of 
sem i-conduct ors–  t hese defi cit s w ere generall y perceived t o be beni gn,  as they w ere 
covered by  capit al  i nfl ow s  wh i ch f unded  l ong-t erm  i nvest me n t   ( Gl i ck,  1999).
A n e w v a r i ant of t he ' f undam ent als'  vi ew  em phasises the rol e of w eak fi nanci al
f undam ental s and m oral hazard i n creati ng fert i l e ground for fi nanci al cri ses.  In t hi s 
r egard,  the cl ose relati ons bet w een governm ent ,  banks and i ndust r y,  typi cal of m any 
As i an count r i es, are now  w i del y t hought  r esponsi bl e for mo r al -hazard behavi our,
r efl ecti ng t he existence of  ( expl i cit   or  i mp l i cit )   governm ent   safety  net s.  Thi s l ed t o    ' bad 
banki ng'  practi ces, wh i ch took t he form o f  excessive l endi ng and over-invest me n t   i n 
l ow   product i vi t y  proj ects ( e.g.   I MF ,   1997;   Kr ugm an,   1998).
Ther e are a num ber  of  t heoreti cal  m odel s t hat   expl ain  how   w eak f i nanci al  f undam ent als 
can l ead t o  a cri sis.    Mc Ki nnon  and  Pi l l   ( 1997),   f or  i nst ance,  argue  t hat   i n  an i nadequat e 
r egul atory f r am ew ork,   banks can i nfl ate entr epreneurs expected payoff s,  know i ng t hat  
i n case of  default   t he governm ent   wi l l   be f orced t o bai l   out   di str essed borr ow ers.  The 
entr epreneurs,  l acking suff i cient  i nforma t i on t o assess banks’  signal s,  t end t o consi der 
t hem   as corr ect.     As   a r esult ,   t hey  bi d  eagerl y  f or  f unds  and  a l ending-i nvest me n t   boom  
ensues.  Cor sett i ,   Pesent i   and  Roubi ni   ( 1999)  devel op  a m odel   i n  wh i ch a f i nanci al  cri sis 
erupt s as a result  of pot enti al fut ure fi scal defi cit s that  are imp l i ed by m oral hazard 
behavi our i n pri vat e corporate and fi nanci al i nvest me n t .  The l att er l eads to over-2
i nvest me n t ,  wh i ch can persist  f or  as l ong as dom est i c f i r ms   are able t o r efi nance t hei r  
unprofi t able proj ects and  cash short f all s t hrough  f oreign  borr ow i ng,   a process know n  as 
evergreening.     On l y  wh e n   i nt ernat i onal   r eserves  f all   bel ow   a cert ain  t hreshol d 
2,   f oreign 
i nvest ors'  wi l l i ngness t o rol l -over credit  w oul d cease, causing a fi nanci al cri sis.  In a 
simi l ar  vei n,   H uang and Xu   ( 1999)  argue t hat   over -invest me n t   wa s   due t o soft -budget
const r aint s,  wh i ch enabled l arge i ndust r i al  Ko r ean congl om erates ( chaebols)  t o have a 
cont i nuous access to secure and subsi di sed pol i cy loans.  In a soft -budget   const r aint  
econom y,   t here i s no m echanism  t hat   ensures t hat   bad proj ects are t ermi nat ed because 
bad si gnal s are not  revealed to i nvest ors or deposi t ors, creati ng undul y opt i mi sti c
expectati ons.  H ence, l oss-m aki ng proj ects can be hi dden for a long t i me  b y
' overborr ow i ng' .  These probl em s onl y becom e apparent w hen an exogenous shock,  
even a very  mi l d  one,   hi t s t he  econom y.  
Wh i l e there has been a healt hy analyt i cal debat e of t he A si an fi nanci al cri sis,
accom panied by t he devel opm ent   of  new  t heoreti cal  m odel s,  t here has been very l i t t l e 
em pir i cal testi ng of the vari ous hypot heses that  have been put  forwa r d i n t he specif i c 
cont ext  of  t he As i an cri sis.    Thi s paper  ma k e s   a step i n t hi s di r ecti on by provi di ng new  
em pir i cal evidence fr om  Sout h K orea that  sheds li ght  on t he t heoreti cal expl anati ons 
out l i ned above.  Specif i call y,  we  p r ovi de an em pir i cal analysi s of the K orean credit  
ma r ket ,   wh i ch show s  t hat ,   wi t h  f ew  excepti ons,   i t   wa s   characteri sed by  excessive  credit  
creati on  since t he  l ate 1960s.   We   i nt erpret  our  esti ma t es of  excess credit   as m easures of 
' unproduct i ve credit ' ,  ul t i ma t ely t r anslated int o non-perf ormi ng l oans.  Ou r  em pir i cal 
f i ndi ngs are broadl y consi stent  wi t h t he ' overl endi ng'   and ' overi nvest me n t '   hypot hesi s. 
Ho we v e r ,   we   also argue  t hat   t he  presence of  ' unproduct i ve'   credit   by  i t self   need not   l ead 
t o  a f i nanci al  cri sis,  so t hat   i n  order  t o  provi de  an expl anati on  f or  t he  cri sis one  needs t o 
exam ine ot her devel opm ent s duri ng t he 1990s.  Specif i call y,  we  a r gue t hat
' unproduct i ve'   credit   becam e a ma j or  source of  f r agil i t y onl y aft er  t he l i berali sati on of 
short -term  capit al fl ow s i n t he 1990s,  wh i ch eroded t he abi l i t y of the K orean centr al 
bank t o act as an eff ecti ve l ender of last resort ,  thereby creati ng fert i l e ground for 
f i nanci al  pani c. 
We  a l so provi de an em pir i cal analysi s of tot al factor product i vi t y (TFP)  grow t h t hat  
wa r ns against  an over-simp l i f i cati on of our fi ndi ng concerni ng unproduct i ve credit .
Specif i call y,   we   show  t hat   i n spi t e of  t he presence of  unproduct i ve credit ,   t he banki ng 
system ' s cont r i but i on t o T FP w as signi f i cantl y posi t i ve duri ng t he l ast three decades, 
2  I n  Cor sett i ,   Pesent i   and  Roubi ni   ( 1999),     t he  t hreshol d  i s expressed as a f r acti on  of  i mp l i c governm ent  
l i abil i t i es w hich m ainl y ari se due t o excessive foreign borr ow i ng by t he pri vat e sector and
overi nvest me n t  in l ow  product i vi t y proj ects. It  is int eresti ng t o not e that  these i mp l i cit  governm ent  
l i abil i t i es  can  coexist  wi t h  a  l ow   publ i c  debt   and  budget   defi cit .  3
alt hough  TFP w oul d have been greater had t he proport i on of 'unproduct i ve'  credit  to 
t ot al  credit   been sm all er.
The  r est  of  t he paper  i s organi sed as f ol l ow s.     Secti on 2 presents t he em pir i cal  analysi s 
of t he K orean credit  ma r ket  wh i l e Secti on 3 focuses on t he i m pact of f i nanci al
devel opm ent  and excess credit  on average product i vi t y of capit al.   Final l y,  secti on 4 
s u mma r i ses and  concl udes.
2.   ' Unproduct i ve  C redit '  
Thi s secti on provi des an em pir i cal analysi s of the Sout h K orean credit  ma r ket  that  
r eveals t he presence of  persistent  excessive credit   creati on by t he banki ng system .  Ou r  
em pir i cal analysi s is novel  in at  least two  r espects. Fi r stl y,  it  takes int o account  the 
i nst i t ut i onal  characteri sti cs of t he Sout h K orean credit  ma r ket ,  i ncl udi ng t he di r ect
eff ects of fi nanci al restr aint s that  we r e prevalent unt i l  t he l ate 1980s.  Secondl y,  i t
ut i l i ses m odern t i me - s e r i es m ethods t hat  all ow  us t o const r uct  a m easure of short -run
di sequi l i bri um ,   wh i ch r efl ects excess suppl y  or  dem and.
We   begi n  wi t h  a di scussion  of  econom et r i c me t hodol ogy,   f ol l ow ed  by  a bri ef  out l i ne  of 
t he  i nst i t ut i onal   characteri sti cs of  t he  Sout h  Ko r ean credit   ma r ket .     We   t hen  specif y  our 
credit  ma r ket  m odel ,  di scuss our esti ma t i on m et hod and dat a and present our result s.
The  concl udi ng  part   of  t hi s secti on  provi des  an analyt i cal  di scussion  of  t he  i mp l i cati ons 
of excess credit ,  expl ori ng i t s int eracti ons w i t h ot her fi nanci al vul nerabil i t i es, thereby 
off eri ng  a pl ausibl e expl anati on  of  t he  cri sis.
Me t hodol ogi cal  I ssues
I n evaluat i ng w het her a credit  ma r ket  is characteri sed by credit -rati oni ng or excess 
suppl y,   previous  em pir i cal  studi es ( e.g.   Laf f ont   and Ga r cia,  1977;   Pazarbasi ogl u,   1996) 
have used a di sequi l i bri um  m odel  of suppl y and dem and due t o M addal a and Ne l son 
( 1974).   Thi s m ethod of esti ma t i on assum es t hat  i n  s o me  ma r ket s, pri ces are not
perf ectl y fl exibl e and hence di sequi l i bri um  coul d occur.  I n the absence of any
i nforma t i on concerni ng t he pri ce-adjust me n t  process, the probabi l i t y w i t h w hi ch each 
observat i on bel ongs t o t he dem and or  suppl y f unct i on i s det ermi ned by assum ing t hat  
t he short   side of  t he ma r ket   i s never  r ati oned.     M addal a and Ne l son ( 1974)  deri ve  t he 
appropri ate ma x i mu m  l i kel i hood me t hod f or  t hi s class of  m odel s. 
By  sti pul ati ng t hat   t he l ong side of  t he ma r ket   i s t he one t hat  is r ati oned,   t he  t r adit i onal  
di sequi l i bri um  approach, wh i l e all ow i ng for not i onal  excess suppl y,  rul es out  t he
possibi l i t y  of  an eff ecti ve excess suppl y of  credit .   That   i s t o say,  i n t hi s f r am ew ork an 
excess suppl y  of  credit   can onl y  r epresent  t he  case i n  wh i ch banks  are wi l l i ng  t o  suppl y 
mo r e credit   t han  f i r ms   are wi l l i ng  t o  accept,   so t hat   an excess suppl y  of  credit   can never 4
be reali sed. In practi ce it  is possibl e that  fi r ms  t ake on m ore credit  than w oul d be 
predicted by  t he  usual   l ong-run  det ermi nant s of  t he  dem and  f or  credit   –  wh i ch t ypi call y 
i ncl ude t he cost  of credit  and an i ndi cator of real econom i c acti vi t y.   The case of an 
eff ecti ve oversuppl y of credit  ma y  r efl ect the presence of  ' unproduct i ve credit ' ,  i. e. 
credit   t hat   i s not   used  t o  f i nance  new   product i ve  acti vi t i es.    The  l att er  ma y   be  t he  r esult  
of loss-m aking proj ects that  are conti nual l y refi nanced by banks.   Banks have m any 
r easons w hy t hey m ay w i sh to refi nance unprofi t able proj ects.  These incl ude t hei r  
desi r e t o prevent  bankrupt cies,  t he hope t hat   t he com panies concerned ma y   be able t o 
cross-subsidi se loss m aking proj ects fr om  m ore profi t able ones or –  ul t i ma t ely –  be 
bai l ed out  by t he governm ent .  Thus,  ' unproduct i ve credit ' ,  or an oversuppl y of credit ,  
corr esponds closel y t o t he not i on of  overi nvest me n t ,   r efl ecti ng soft   budget   const r aint s 
and/ or  mo r al  hazard.   The  r eason w hy  com panies,  i n  t urn,   ma y   i n  t he  short   r un  wi l l i ngl y 
accept  mo r e credit   t han i s predicted by t hei r   l ong r un dem and f unct i on i s t hat   i t   keeps 
t hem  afl oat ,  all ow i ng t hem  t i me  t o restr uct ure or engage i n profi t able acti vi t i es. In a 
r apidl y  grow i ng  econom y  l i ke  Sout h  Ko r ea t hi s sit uat i on  wa s   qui t e com m on.  
Thi s analysi s suggest s t hat   t he eff ecti ve  or  short -run  stock  of  credit   ma y   we l l   exceed t he 
l ong-run desi r ed dem and f or  credit ,   as a r esult   of  ' unproduct i ve credit ' .     I t   i s,  t herefore, 
vi t al  t o all ow  f or  t he possibi l i t y t hat  a short- run observat i on ma y   bel ong t o nei t her  t he 
l ong run dem and nor  t he l ong run suppl y f unct i on.     I n spit e of  t he short   r un devi ati ons 
f r om  l ong-run  equi l i bri um ,   i t   i s nevert hel ess pl ausibl e t o  expect  t o  see som e adjust me n t  
t ow ards l ong-run m arket  equi l i bri um  f or bot h dem and and suppl y funct i ons.  Thi s
assum pti on  i s consi stent  wi t h  bot h  t heoreti cal  and  em pir i cal  wo r k.   For   i nst ance,  despi t e 
t he presence of informa t i on asym m et r y,  Laf f ont  and G arcia (1977) fi nd t hat  the real 
i nt erest  r ate has t he t endency t o adjust  upw ards  wh e n   t here i s excess dem and  f or  credit .  
On   t he ot her  hand,   wh e n   t here i s an excess suppl y of  credit ,   t here i s no r eason w hy t he 
i nt erest r ate shoul d not  f all  t o equi l i brate the m arket  ( Gr eenw ood,  Levi nson and
St i gl i t z,  1993).
M odern t i me - s e r i es econom et r i c m ethods,  such as coint egrati on and err or-corr ecti on,
all ow  l ong-run behavi our to be dri ven by econom i c theory and short -run dynam i cs t o 
bedet ermi ned  f l exibl y  by  t he  dat a
3.     Thus,   we   use  coint egrati on  analysi s t o  esti ma t e t he 
underl yi ng l ong-run equi l i bri um  relati onshi p bet w een the st ock of credit  and i t s
det ermi nant s. Thi s, i n t urn,  all ow s us t o const r uct  a m easure of short -run
di sequi l i bri um ,  wh i ch m ay refl ect eit her ' unproduct i ve credit '  – di scussed above - or 
credit   r ati oni ng.   The  l att er  case – i . e.  wh e n   t he actual   stock of  credit   i s l ow er  t han t he 
l ong-run equi l i bri um  st ock of credit-  c o r r esponds t o t he t r adit i onal  approach to
3  See  f or  exam ple  H endry  ( 1995)  or  t he  papers i n  t he  Engl e  and  Gr anger  ( 1991)  edit ed  vol um e.5
' f i nanci al  r epression'   of  Mc Ki nnon ( 1973)  and Shaw  ( 1973)
4.     Thi s approach suggest s 
t hat  int erest rate restr i cti ons and ot her 'r epressive'  pol i cies, by depressing real int erest 
r ates,  l ead t o  a short age of  credit .
To  s u mma r i se, our  esti ma t i on m et hod di f f ers fr om  t he t r adit i onal  di sequi l i bri um
approach out l i ned  above  i n  t he  f ol l ow i ng  f our  i m port ant  r espects. 
1. It  assum es that  i n t he l ong run,  the i nt erest rate adjust s to equi l i brate the credit  
ma r ket  wh i l e all ow i ng for depart ures fr om  l ong-run equi l i bri um  t o occur in t he 
short   r un.  
2. O ur approach does not  im pose a pri ori  restr i cti ons on t he speed of adjust me n t ,  
wh i ch adm it s the possi bi l i t y t hat  the credit  ma r ket  ma y  t ake a very l ong t i me  t o 
clear.   Thus,   t he  assum pti on  t hat   i n  t he  l ong-run  ma r ket   equi l i bri um   prevail s i s not   a 
r estr i cti ve  one,   since t he  l ong  r un  i s det ermi ned  by  t he  dat a.
3. O ur  me t hod of  i dent i f yi ng peri ods of  excess suppl y or  dem and f or  credit   does not  
depend  on  t he  som ehow   arbi t r ary  me t hod  of  esti ma t i ng  a  set  of  probabi l i t i es,  wh i ch 
are t hen used t o l ocate an observat i on on t he l ong r un dem and or  suppl y f unct i on.  
I nst ead,  our  me t hod of  i dent i f yi ng excess suppl y or  dem and consi sts of  m easuri ng 
t he  depart ure of  actual   credit   f r om   i t s predicted l ong-run  equi l i bri um   val ue,   ut i l i sing 
standard t echni ques i n appl i ed t i me - s e r i es econom et r i cs.
4. O ur me t hod al l ow s t he possi bi l i t y t hat  the actual  stock of credit  m ay exceed t he 
l ong run dem and for credit ,  representi ng t he presence of ' unproduct i ve credit ' ,
wh i ch t he  t r adit i onal   di sequi l i bri um   approach does  not   adm it .
I nst i t ut i onal   Charact eristi cs
Si nce the earl y 1960s,  one of the m ost  im port ant inst i t ut i onal  characteri sti cs of  the 
Sout h K orean credit  ma r ket  has been t he di r ect i nt ervent i on of t he st ate in t he
all ocati on and pri cing of  credit .   Thi s wa s   ma i nl y achieved t hrough cont r ol s on l endi ng 
and deposi t  int erest rates. These contr ol s w ere in pl ace unti l  the l ate 1970s w hen t he 
Ko r ean governm ent  em barked on a progra mme  o f  f i nanci al l i berali sati on.  The
centr epiece of vari ous at t em pts at fi nanci al li berali sati on i n K orea and elsew here has 
been int erest rate deregul ati on ( De mi r güç-K unt  and D et r agiache, 1998).I n 1979,   t he 
Mo n e t ary Board abol i shed the m axi mu m i nt erest rate on bank l oans.  Ho we v e r ,  gi ven 
Ko r ean banks’ inexperi ence in set t i ng i nt erest rates, the K orean B ankers’ A ssociati on 
l i nked t he l endi ng i nt erest r ate to t he Bank of Ko r ea’s rediscount  r ate, l i mi t i ng
seri ousl y  t he  abil i t y  of  c o mme r cial  banks  t o  alt er  i nt erest  r ates on  l oans.   I n  1984,   banks 
we r e all ow ed t o charge di f f erent rates accordi ng t o borr ow ers'  credit wo r t hi ness, but  
wi t hi n a very narr ow  band.   I t   i s not   unt i l   1988 t hat   banks began t o enjoy f r eedom  over 
4  See  Fr y  ( 1995)  f or  an  overvi ew   of  t hi s l i t erature.6
i nt erest  r ate det ermi nat i on wh e n   cont r ol s on l endi ng r ates f or  bot h banks and non-bank
f i nanci al i nt erme d i ari es w ere relaxed. The l i berali sati on process cont i nued i n t he
1990s.   I n  1995,   t he  Bank  of  Ko r ea l i berali sed i nt erest  r ates on  pol i cy l oans  and  i n  1996
l i f t ed the restr i cti on on t he si ze of the prem ium  a bank coul d charge over it s pri me  
l endi ng  r ate.
The r elaxati on of ceil i ngs on deposi t  rates w as a very gradual  process.  In 1979,  the 
M onet ary Board abol i shed the m axi mu m i nt erest rate ceil i ng on personal   checking 
deposi t s,  but   ma i nt ained  cont r ol s on  all   ot her  f orms   of  deposi t s.  I t   i s onl y  as r ecentl y  as 
1988 t hat  int erest rate contr ol s on cert ain t i m e and savi ng deposi t s w ere li berali sed. 
Specif i call y,   t he  Bank  of  Ko r ea l i f t ed i nt erest  r ate cont r ol s on  t i me   deposi t s of  ma t uri t y 
greater  t han  2  years at  banks,   post al  savings  and  credit   uni ons,   and  on  t i me   and  savings 
deposi t s of ma t uri t y greater than 1 year at mu t ual  savings and fi nance com panies. In
1991,  t he scope of i ni t i al l i berali sati on w as ext ended t o cover r ates on l ong t erm
deposi t s wi t h a ma t uri t y of  3 years off ered by banks,   mu t ual   credit   f acil i t i es,  and credit  
uni ons.  Du r i ng t he peri od 1993-1994,  the i nt erest rate on l ong t erm  deposi t s w it h a 
ma t uri t y  of  at  l east  t wo   years we r e com pletely  l i berali sed.  I t   i s onl y  as r ecent  as i n  1995 
t hat   t he  Bank  of  Ko r ea r em oved  r estr i cti ons  on  t he  r em aini ng  r egul ated i nt erest  r ates on 
bank  and  non-bank  t i me   deposi t s wi t h  a ma t uri t y  of  l ess t han  six  m ont hs.
M odel   specif i cati on
We   specif y  a m odel   f or  t he l ong-run  dem and  f or  and  suppl y  of  bank  credit ,   wh i ch t akes 
i nt o  account   t he  i nst i t ut i onal   characteri sti cs out l i ned  above.
A. The  l ong-run  suppl y of   credit   equat i on
The r eal suppl y of loans i n t he l ong run i s expected to depend upon t he real lendi ng 
i nt erest rate ( r), the curr ent out put  (y) and fi nanci al restr aint s. The f i r st two  v a r i ables 
are wi del y used i n em pir i cal  studi es t o capture r especti vel y t he profi t abil i t y of  banks’ 
l endi ng act i vi t i es and the expect ati ons about  the st ate of the econom y (Laf f ont  and 
Ga r cia,  1977;   Pazarbasi ogl u,   1996).   The  i nfl uence of  f i nanci al  r estr aint s on t he suppl y 
of  credit ,   on t he ot her  hand,   has not   been addressed i n t he em pir i cal  l i t erature on credit  
ma r ket s despit e thei r  presence in m any devel opi ng and devel oped count r i es
( Pazarbasi ogl u,  1996;   G hosh  and  G hosh,   1999).  
The  i m pact  of  i nt erest  r ate cont r ol s on t he r eal  suppl y of  credit   i s not   str aight f orwa r d.  
I n pri nci pl e, l endi ng rate contr ol s, by l i mi t i ng banks’ profi t abil i t y,  shoul d aff ect
adversely t he r eal  suppl y of  credit   t o t he pri vat e sector.   Ho we v e r ,   as not ed by Ca pr i o 
( 1994),  i n t he presence of hi gher i nt erest r ates, wh i ch usual l y fol l ow  fi nanci al
l i berali sati on,  banks m ay choose t o hol d l arger am ount s of ri skless assets and hence 
suppl y f ew er  l oans t o t he pri vat e sector.   H ence,  t he i m pact  of  t he r elaxati on of  l endi ng 
r ate cont r ol s on t he suppl y of  credit   i s am biguous.     The  sam e concl usi on hol ds f or  t he 7
i m pact  of  deposi t   r ate cont r ol s on  t he  suppl y  of  r eal  credit ,   even t hough  t he  r easoning  i s 
di f f erent.   On   t he one hand,   t hese cont r ol s l i mi t   t he cost  of  f unds f or  banks and hence 
i ncrease t he wi l l i ngness of banks t o suppl y i ncreased am ount s of credit .  On  t he ot her 
hand,  how ever,  deposi t  rate contr ol s li mi t  the suppl y of funds t o t he banki ng system  
wh i ch,  unl ess count eracted by ot her  me a n s ,   such as i ncreased branching or  ma r ket i ng,  
are l i kel y  t o  r educe t he  abi l i t y of  banks  t o  suppl y  i ncreased am ount s of  credit .
I n addi t i on t o i nt erest r ate restr aint s, f i nanci al r estr aint s typi call y i ncl ude requi r ed
r eserve requi r em ents on bank deposi t s (dem and and/ or ti m e and savi ngs deposi t s).
Us u a l l y,   t he defi ni t i on of  r eserves i ncl udes short -term  governm ent   paper  and/ or  centr al 
bank deposi t s, wh i ch typi call y yi eld a l ow er rate of return t han bank l oans.   H ence, 
i ncreases in reserve requi r em ents raise t he average cost of loanabl e funds and are, 
t herefore, expected to result  in an i nw ard shi f t  of the suppl y of credit  to t he pri vat e 
sector.
Thus,   we   use t he f ol l ow i ng specif i cati on f or  t he l ong-run  suppl y  of  credit :  
C
s  =  b0  +b1  y +  b2  r +  b3  I RR  +  b4RR    +    ut ( 1)
Wh e r e I RR  i s t he  i nt erest  r ate r estr aint s and  RR  i s t he  r equi r ed r eserve  r ati o.
B.   The  l ong-run  dem and  f or  credit   equat i on 
W e specif y a si mp l e long-run dem and for credit  equat i on w here the real dem and for 
credit   depends posi t i vel y on t he l evel  of  r eal  econom i c acti vi t y,   approxi ma t ed by  r eal 
GDP ( y) and negat i vel y on t he cost  of credit ,  m easured by t he real lendi ng rate ( r).
Thus,   we   use t he f ol l ow i ng specif i cati on f or  t he l ong-run  dem and  f or  credit :
C
d  =  a0  +  a1  y +  a2  r +  vt ( 2)
C.   Reduced For m
W e assum e that  in t he l ong-run,  the real int erest rate is fl exibl e enough t o equat e the 
r eal  suppl y  and  dem and  f or  credit   i . e.  t he  exchanged quant i t y  of  credit   i s such t hat :
Q
c  =  C
d  =  C
s ( 3)
W e next  solve for t he reduced form  equat i on by subst i t ut i ng t he val ue of r fr om
equat i on  ( 2)  i n  ( 1)  t o  obt ain  t he  f ol l ow i ng:
C  =  g 0  +  g 1y +  g 2I RR  +  g 3RR  +  wt ( 4)8
Wh e r eg 0  =  ( a2b0-a0b2/ a2- b2)
g 1  = ( a2b1-a1b2/ a2- b2) ; g 1  >  0
g 2  = ( a2b3 / a2- b2) g 2>0  or  g 2<0
g 3  = ( a2b4/ a2- b2) g 3<0
Da t a
Two  vari ables are used t o m easure t he dependent   vari able:  r eal  broad claims   and r eal 
narr ow  cl aim s on t he pri vat e sector.  R eal broad credit  (D B)  i s m easured by (t he
l ogari t hm  of)  claim s on pri vat e sector by deposi t  m oney banks,  t r ust account s of 
c o mme r cial  banks,   devel opm ent   banks,   and  non-bank  f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons,   defl ated by 
t he  GDP  defl ator.   R eal  narr ow   credit   ( DN)   i s ( t he  l ogari t hm   of)   a narr ow er  m easure t hat  
i ncl udes cl aim s on pri vat e sector of deposi t  m oney banks onl y.   T he data source for 
t hese vari ables, as w ell  as real GDP a n d  t he G D P defl ator,  is Int ernat i onal   Fi nanci al  
St at i sti cs ( CD  ROM ,   1998: 6).  
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The l endi ng-rate and deposi t -rate cont r ol   vari ables are const r uct ed f r om  dat a coll ected 
f r om Bank of  Kor e a,  Annual  Report s  ( vari ous i ssues).  These vari ables are simp l e
ari t hm et i c averages of d u mmi es that  take the val ue of 1 i n peri ods w hen a specif i ed 
i nt erest rate is cont r ol l ed and 0 otherwi se. St r ong posi t i ve corr elati on bet w een the 
l endi ng-rate and deposi t -rate contr ol  vari ables all ow s us t o average them  out  int o a 
singl e  s u mma r y m easure of i nt erest rate restr aint s (I RR) .  Thi s m easure is plot t ed in
f i gure 1.   I t s m ovem ent s r efl ect  t he changes i n  t he  underl yi ng  pol i cy vari able r easonabl y 
we l l .  The r elaxati on of lendi ng cont r ol s in 1979 i s refl ected in a sharp drop i n t he 
m easure f or  t hat   year.   The  m easure t hen exhi bi t s r elati ve stabil i t y unt i l   1988,   wh e n   i t  
drops sharpl y f ol l ow i ng t he l i berali sati on of  i nt erest  r ates on cert ain t ypes of  t i me   and 9
savings deposi t s. Fur t her drops are observed i n t he earl y 1990s refl ecti ng furt her
deregul ati on  i n  deposi t   r ates and  l endi ng  r ates on  pol i cy l oans.
Da t a on reserve requi r em ents on (i )  dem and and (i i )  ti m e and savi ng deposi t s w ere 
coll ected f r om  Bank of  Kor e a,  Annual  Report s  (vari ous i ssues).  B ecause of the very 
hi gh corr elati on bet w een the t wo  v a r i ables, we  u s e  t hei r  ari t hm et i c average as a
s u mma r y m easure of  r eserve r equi r em ents ( RR) .     Thi s m easure,  i l l ust r ated i n Fi gure 2,  
r egisters an upw ard j um p duri ng 1966-67,  wh i ch coinci des w i t h t he fi r st w ave of
r eforms   t hat   saw  l arge i ncreases i n i nt erest  r ates and r eserve r equi r em ents,  r esult i ng i n 
i ncreased state cont r ol   over  t he banki ng system  ( Ha r r i s,  1988).     RR  exhi bi t s a decli ne 
duri ng 1968-1971 and fl uct uat es w idel y i n t he 1970s.  In t he earl y 1980s,  the i ndex
show s a sharp decl i ne,  wh i ch coinci des w i t h t he relaxati on of lending rate contr ol s 
wh i l e t he 1987-1989 peri od r egistered consi derable i ncreases i n r eserve r equi r em ents. 
I n t he 1990s,  RR e xhi bi t s relati ve st abil i t y t o decl i ne si gni f i cantl y i n 1997 w hen
r equi r ed r eserve  r equi r em ents on  all   t ypes  of  deposi t s we r e set  at  2% .







































































































Es t i ma t i on
Al l  vari ables w ere ini t i all y subj ected to uni t  root  t ests, wh i ch suggest ed that  bot h
m easures of the st ock of credit ,  as w ell  as real GDP,  the i nt erest rate restr aint s, and 
r eserve requi r em ents are non-st ati onary.  Si nce these vari ables contain uni t  root s, we  
use a coint egrati on est i ma t or to est i ma t e the reduced form r elati onshi p bet w een them  
gi ven by equat i on (4).   Specif i call y,  w e appl y t he dynam i c ordi nary l east squares
( DOLS)  esti ma t or ( Sai kkonen,  1991;  St ock and W at son,  1993).  Thi s esti ma t or i s
asym pt ot i call y equi val ent to Johansen’s (1988) ma x i mu m- l i kel i hood est i ma t or in t he 
case wh e r e vari ables are I ( 1)  and  t here i s a singl e coint egrati ng  vector.   Mo r eover,   i t   has 
been show n t o perf orm we l l  in fi ni t e sam ples relati ve t o ot her  asym pt ot i call y  eff i cient 10
esti ma t ors ( St ock  and  Wa t son,   1993).   I n  t hese  cir cum stances i t   i s know n  t hat   t he  Engl e-
Gr anger  ( 1987)  esti ma t or  ma y   exhi bi t   subst anti al  bi as ( Ba ne r j ee et  al,   1986;   St ock and 
Wa t son,   1993).   DOLS  has  a f urt her  advant age over  t he  Engl e-G ranger  esti ma t or.   Wh i l e 
t he l att er  suff ers f r om  a non-st andard asym pt ot i c di str i but i on ( Par k and Phi l l i ps,   1988),  
t he f orme r   all ow s val i d and eff i cient  i nferences on t he param eters of  t he coint egrati ng 
vector.   W e fi r st appl y  DOLS t o t he reduced-form  equat i on (equat i on 4) and obt ain 
esti ma t es of t he coi nt egrati ng vect or f or t he credit  ma r ket .  W e next  com put e the
predicted long-run equi l i bri um  val ues and com pare t hem  wi t h t he corr espondi ng actual  
stock  of  r eal  credit ,   wh i ch all ow s  us  t o  const r uct   our  m easure of  di sequi l i bri um   credit .
Empi rical  Res ul t s
Tabl e 1 r eport s t he r esult s of  esti ma t i ng equat i on ( 4)  usi ng t wo   di f f erent  defi ni t i ons of 
t he dependent  vari able.  In M odel  A t he l att er is m easured by (t he l ogari t hm  of)  real 
broad claims   wh i l e i n M odel   B  i t   i s m easured by t he l ogari t hm  of  r eal  narr ow  claims .  
The i nt erest rate-restr aint s index ent ers w it h a posi t i ve si gn,  indi cati ng t hat  relaxati on 
of  i nt erest  r ate cont r ol s r esult s i n a decli ne of  t he equi l i bri um  stock of  r eal  credit   t o t he 
pri vat e sector.     The  r est  of  t he expl anatory vari ables enter  wi t h t he expected signs and 
are stati sti call y si gni f i cant.  The esti ma t ed coeff i cient of real GDP h a s  t he expect ed 
posi t i ve si gn,  takes a plausibl e value and i s stati sti call y si gni f i cant wh i l e the reserve 
r equi r em ent i ndex ent ers w it h t he expect ed negat i ve si gn and i s also stati sti call y
signi f i cant at the 5%  l evel.  The equati on perf orms  we l l  as refl ected in hi gh R
2  and 
passes vari ous di agnost i c t ests.  Fi nal l y,   accordi ng t o t he Di ckey-Full er  and  A ugm ent ed 
Di ckey-Full er  stati sti cs,  t he hypot hesi s of  a uni t   r oot   i n t he r esidual s i s r ejected at  t he 
1%  l evel.   There is, therefore, li t t l e doubt  that  M odel  A r epresents a coint egrati ng 
r elati onshi p.
The r esult s fr om  M odel  B a r e simi l ar to t hose obt ained above w i t h t wo  excepti ons.  
Fi r st,   t he r eserve r equi r em ent  i ndex enters wi t h a posi t i ve sign,   but   i s not   signi f i cant  at 
convent i onal  levels.
5 Second,  the coeff i cient on i nt erest rate restr aint s is consi derably 
bi gger than t hat  of m odel  A.  Thi s is not  surpri sing si nce these restr aint s w ere m ainl y 
i m posed  on  deposi t   m oney  banks  and  hence  are l i kel y  t o  have  a bi gger  i m pact  on  t hese 
banks’ lendi ng act i vi t y.  M odel  B a l so perf orms  we l l  and passes vari ous di agnost i c 
t ests. Fur t hermo r e, the hypot hesi s of a uni t  root  is rejected at the 1%  l evel indi cati ng 
t hat   M odel   B  f orms   a coint egrati ng  vector.  
5  Ho we v e r ,   i t   i s i nt eresti ng  t o  not e  t hat   t he  f i r st  l ag  and  t he  f i r st  l ead  of  t he  f i r st  di f f erence  of  t hi s i ndex 
( not   r eport ed  i n  t he  t able)  enter  wi t h  t he  expected  negat i ve  sign  and  are  signi f i cant  at  t he  1%   l evel.11
Tabl e  1  -   Co i nt egrati ng  V ector  f or  t he  C redit   M arket
(Sam pl e  peri od:  1954- 1997)
Re gr essors M odel   A 
        D B
M odel   B
      DN
















Di agnost i c t ests
Ad j - R
2 0. 995 0. 986
J-B0 . 105[0. 948] 4. 435[0. 108]
Q( 10, 0) 8. 054[0. 623] 15. 74[0. 107]
Coi nt egrati on  t est
DF - 4. 650* -4. 014*
ADF( 1) -5. 246* -4. 711*
ADF( 2) -4. 137* -3. 793*
No t es:
(1) D B denot es (t he l ogari t hm  of)  r eal broad cl aim s on pri vat e sector by deposi t  m oney banks,
devel opm ent   banks,   non- bank f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons and t r ust   account s of  c o mme r cial  banks.   DN i s a 
narr ow er m easure w hich excludes devel opm ent  banks and non-bank fi nanci al int erme d i ari es and 
t r ust   account s.  The  GDP  defl ator  defl ates  bot h  t hese  vari ables. 
(2) LY  denot es the l ogari t hm  of real GDP,  IRR i s the i ndex of int erest rate restr aint s; and RR i s the 
i ndex  of  r eserve  r equi r em ents.  The  equat i on  also i ncl udes  a d u mmy   vari able f or  t he  1973  oi l   cri sis. 
Fi gures  i n  parentheses are  t he  adjust ed-standard  err ors ( See  Ha mi l t on,   1994).
(3) T he m ethod of esti ma t i on i s  DOLS ( St ock and W at son,  1993).  Gi ven t he sm al l  num ber of
observat i ons,   t o  avoid  over - param eteri zati on  we   onl y  r etain  signi f i cant  l ags  and  l eads  ( I nder  1995).
(4) J-B  is Jaques B err a' s test for norma l i t y;  Q i s L jung and Box t est for autocorr elati on.  Fi gures in 
brackets are  t he  p- val ues.
*  Si gni f i cant  at  t he  1%   l evel;   **    Si gni f i cant  at  t he  5%   l evel.
Tabl e 2 cont ains our  m easure of  credit   ma r ket   di sequi l i bri um ,   based on M odel   A.   Thi s 
m easure is obt ained by subt r acti ng t he predicted long-run equi l i bri um  val ue of credit  
f r om  t he actual  stock of real credit  and di vi di ng t hi s dif f erence by real  t ot al  claims .  
H ence, it  is the proport i on of tot al credit  that  represents excess suppl y or dem and.  
Tabl e 2 also incl udes t he Bank of Ko r ea' s esti ma t es of non-perf ormi ng l oans as a 
percentage of t ot al credit ,  for com pari son purposes.  We  a l so plot  our e sti ma t es of
excess dem and and excess suppl y of credit  (i n t r i l l i ons of Ko r ean w ons),  again based 
on m odel   A.  12
Tabl e  2  -   Es t i ma t es of  O versuppl y  of  C redit
Per i od EXC B
1
( %  of  r eal  broad  claims )
N on-Per f ormi ng  Loans
2
( %  of  t ot al  credit )
  3
1960-1969 13. 45 1. 5
4
1970-1979 13. 17 1. 7
1980-1989 7. 82 7. 8
1990 3. 33 7. 5
1991 0. 00 6. 6
1992 0. 16 6. 7
1993 7. 78 7. 0
1994 6. 75 5. 6
1995 7. 20 5. 2
1996 7. 30 3. 9
No t es:
(1) E X C B  i s excess  suppl y  of  credit   esti ma t ed  usi ng  M odel   A  i n  Tabl e  1.  
( 2)      No n - perform ing  credi t   of  t he  26  c o mme r cial  banks  ( 16  nat i onw i de  banks  and  10  r egional   banks).
  Pr i or  t o  1990,   f i gures  r efer  onl y  t o  nat i onw i de  c o mme r cial  banks.     Sources:  Bank  of  Ko r ea;  Par k
  and  Ki m, 1994.
( 3)      Tot al  credit   i ncl udes  guarantees  and  l oans  f r om   t r ust   account s. 
( 4)      I ncl udes  t he  peri od  1962-1969  onl y.






















































































































Wh a t  em erges fr om  Fi gure 3 is that  t he Sout h K orean credit  ma r ket  has been
characteri sed by:
-c y c l es of  very  mi l d  excess dem and  and  suppl y  unt i l   t he  mi d-1960s.
-i ncreasingl y l arge cycles of  excess credit   since t he mi d-1960s,   wi t h  one 
not able excepti on  i n  t he  mi d-1980s.13
Ho we v e r ,   i n r elati ve t erms   t he pi cture i s som ew hat  di f f erent,   as show n i n Tabl e 2.   The 
average proport i on of  excess credit   i n t he 1970s wa s   approxi ma t ely 13% ,   decli ni ng t o 
8%   i n  t he  1980s  and  t o  4. 6%   i n  t he  1990s.   No t ably,   how ever,   i t   wa s   around  7. 2%   i n  t he 
1993-96  peri od,   wh i ch preceded t he  cri sis. 
A  com pari son wi t h t he Bank of  Ko r ea’s esti ma t es of  non-perf ormi ng l oans r eveals t hat  
wh i l e our 1960-1970 est i ma t es diverge fr om  t he Bank of Ko r ea’s fi gures, the 1980s 
and 1990s esti ma t es are r easonabl y close.   I nt eresti ngl y,   our  esti ma t es of  unproduct i ve 
credit   i n  1993  onw ards  are greater  t han  t he  Bank  of  Ko r ea' s f i gures.  Thi s ma y   be  part l y 
because t he Bank of  Ko r ea f i gures i ncl ude credit   by c o mme r cial  banks onl y,   wh i l e our 
defi ni t i on of  credit   i s broader.     Thi s ma y   expl ain w hy our  esti ma t es f or  t he mo s t   r ecent 
years paint  a w orse picture than t he Bank of Ko r ea' s fi gures, as non-bank fi nanci al 
i nst i t ut i ons  suff ered mo r e f r om   bad  l oans  t han  c o mme r cial  banks.
I nt eresti ngl y,   t able 2  show s  t hat   t he  proport i on  of  excess credit   wa s   equal l y  acute i n  t he 
1980s,   accordi ng  t o  bot h  our  esti ma t es and  t hose  of  t he  Bank  of  Ko r ea,  and  mo r e acute, 
accordi ng t o our ow n est i ma t es in t he 1970s.  Wh i l e w e m ay not  wi sh to pl ace m uch 
em phasi s on  t he  1970s  f i gures,  especiall y  gi ven  t hei r   di vergence  wi t h  t hose  of  t he  Bank 
of  Ko r ea,  t he  1980s  pi cture clearl y  r em ains.   Ho we v e r ,   i f   we   consi der  t he  excess suppl y 
of credit  i n absol ut e terms ,  i t  i s very cl ear f r om  fi gure 3 that  t he vol um e of
unproduct i ve  credit   i ncreased sharpl y  duri ng  t he  1993-1996  peri od.
Anal ysis of   Empi rical  Fi ndi ngs:  The  Cr i sis
The per sistence of excess credit  for a very l ong t i me  i s consistent wi t h t he not i on of 
' overi nvest me n t ' ,  wh i ch suggest s the exi stence of mo r al hazard and/ or soft  budget
const r aint s.  Thi s excess credit ,   wh i ch we   r efer  t o  as ' unproduct i ve' ,   ma y   have  been used 
t o  r efi nance  unprofi t able proj ects and  cash short f all s and ul t i ma t ely  t r anslates i nt o  non-
perf ormi ng l oans (see also C orsett i  et al,  1999).  Thi s, how ever,  does not  necessari l y 
prove  t hat   ' unproduct i ve  credit '   wa s   a cause of  t he  f i nanci al  cri sis.  I t   does,   nevert hel ess, 
provi de som e cl ues,  especiall y i f  i t  i s exam ined i n conj unct i on w i t h earl i er
devel opm ent s.  A  part i cularl y i m port ant  devel opm ent   i n t he 1979-1981  peri od  wa s   t he 
wa y   i n wh i ch bad debt s we r e dealt   wi t h.   Du r i ng t hat   peri od,   banks accum ulated l arge 
am ount s of non-perf ormi ng debt  wh i ch the Bank of Ko r ea covered by i ssuing
subsi di sed credit ,  essenti all y by pri nt i ng dom est i c m oney.   Thi s avert ed a seri ous
banki ng cri sis, alt hough at  a cost of hi gh i nfl ati on (Choi ,  1993;  Na m,  1994).    In t he 
1980s,  how ever,  Sout h K orea w as not int egrated in i nt ernat i onal  fi nanci al ma r ket s, 
wh i ch all ow ed t hi s t ype of  ' solut i on'   t o wo r k.   I n cont r ast,   by t he earl y 1990s,   t hi s wa s  
no l onger possibl e. Fi nanci al l i berali sati on,  wh i ch rem oved m any governm ent
r estr i cti ons on f oreign capit al  i nfl ow s,   encouraged c o mme r cial   and me r chants banks t o 
borr ow  heavi l y fr om  foreign sources on short  ma t uri t i es. I neff ecti ve prudent i al14
supervi sion,  insuff i cient regul ati ons,  and regul atory di stort i ons w hi ch favoured short -
ma t uri t i es i nt ensif i ed t he wa v e   of  short -term  f oreign borr ow i ng ( Chang,   Par k and Y oo,  
1998).  These and other factors
6 cont r i but ed heavil y t o t he accum ul ati on of short -term
f oreign  l i abil i t i es i n  t he  banki ng  system ,  wh i l e i nt ernat i onal   r eserves  wh i ch coul d  cover 
f or  t hem  we r e very l ow .   Thi s sit uat i on i ncreased banks'   vul nerabil i t y t o changes i n t he 
senti me n t s of  f oreign  l enders.  Cont agion  eff ects f r om   t he  r est  of  t he  r egion  and  a seri es 
of  corporate bankrupt cies acted as a ‘ w ake-up call ’   f or  f oreign i nvest ors t o r eassess t he 
f undam ent als of  t he Ko r ean econom y,   i ncl udi ng t he banki ng system  ( Go l dst ein,   1998).  
The r e-assessm ent  exposed seri ous w eaknesses i n t he corporate and banki ng sector  t o 
wh i ch foreign i nvest ors reacted by w i t hdraw ing t hei r  invest me n t s fr om  t he K orean
econom y,  in m any cases by refusi ng t o renew  short -term l oans.  The l arge st ock of 
short -term f oreign l i abil i t i es relati ve t o foreign reserves,  how ever,  m eant the centr al 
bank  coul d  not   guarantee t he  f oreign  debt   nei t her  coul d  i t   act  as a provi der  of  suff i cient 
am ount s of  dol l ar  l i qui di t y t o avert   a r un by f orei gn l enders.    I n essence,  t he Bank of 
Ko r ea’s r ol e as a l ender  of  l ast  r esort   wa s   eroded by t hi s i mb a l ance.  Thus,   t he Ko r ean 
banki ng  system  becam e prone  t o  "self -ful f i l l i ng"  bank  r uns  by  f oreign  l enders.
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3.   Product i vi t y,   Gr o wt h  and  C redit
Thi s secti on carr i es out   an em pir i cal  analysi s of  t he sources of  grow t h i n Sout h Ko r ea, 
bui l di ng on recent wo r k on t he product i vi t y of capit al in East  As i a by D em et r i ades, 
De v e r eux and Lui nt el  ( 1998).   Thi s em pir i cal  analysi s enables us t o t est  wh e t her  excess 
credit   can be consi dered as ' unproduct i ve' .  Fur t hermo r e, it  enables us to assess the 
extent t o w hi ch ' unproduct i ve'  credit  cont r i but ed to t he sl ow dow n of TFP.  Ou r
em pir i cal approach invol ves a num ber of em pir i cal novel t i es. Im port antl y,  inst ead of 
m easuri ng  TFP  as a residual ,   we   esti ma t e i t   di r ectl y by m odel l i ng i t s sources.    To  t hi s 
end w e assum e t hat  TFP can be ascri bed t o fi nanci al devel opm ent  and fi nanci al
r estr aint s. A not her em pir i cal novel t y i s that  we  u t i l i se th e  DOLS e s t i ma t or,  wh i ch
all ow s us t o di sentangl e t he l ong-run relati onshi p bet w een input s and sources of TFP 
grow t h f r om  short -run  dynam i cs. 
M odel   Specif i cati on
The devel opm ent  of the banki ng system  is expected, in pri nci pl e, to have a posi t i ve 
eff ect on product i vi t y,  because it s screening and m oni t ori ng funct i ons are li kel y t o 
6 Ot her factors incl ude t he pegged exchange rate system  w hich generated a false sense of securi t y,  
nul l i f yi ng  expectati ons  of  deval uat i on  and  t i ght   m onet r ay  pol i cy  wh i ch  kept   dom est i c  i nt erest  r ates  above 
wo r l d i nt erest rates, encouraging banks t o realy heavi l y on cheaper foreign credit  (De me t r i ades and 
Fat t ouh,   1999).
7  De s p i t e t he  f act  t hat   t hese  short   - t erm  l oans  coul d  have  been pai d  off   i n  t he  f ut ure,  f oreign  l enders we r e 
not  wi l l i ng t o renew  them .  Thi s pani c sit uat i on on t he l enders'  behal f  m ay have been responsi bl e for 
pl acing  t he  Ko r ean  econom y  on  a  ‘ cri sis’  equi l i bri um   ( see  f or  i nst ance,  Ra de l et  and  Sachs,  1998).15
r esult  in bet t er invest me n t s (Pagano,  1993).   O ther vari ables that  coul d i nfl uence t he 
abil i t y of the banki ng system  to aff ect TFP gr ow t h are int erest rate restr aint s and t he 
l evel of the real int erest rate. W e expect the real int erest rate to al so have a posi t i ve 
eff ect  on  TFP,   since i t   i s l i kel y  t o  act  as a screening  devi ce f or  i nvest me n t   proj ects ( Fr y,  
1995).  As  t o i nt erest rate restr aint s, thei r  im pact on average product i vi t y of capit al is 
am biguous.  It  m ay be argued t hat  such restr aint s im pede the process of f i nanci al
deepening,  reduci ng bot h t he vol um e and product i vi t y of i nvest me n t  (Fr y,  1995).
A ccordi ng t o t hi s view , fi nanci al li berali sati on pol i cies have posi t i ve eff ects on t he 
eff i ciency of i nvest me n t .  On  t he ot her hand,  i nt erest r ate restr aint s m ay infl uence
banki ng system ’s att i t ude t ow ards ri sk-taking;  a restr ained banki ng system  w oul d be 
expected to t ake few er r i sks, f i nanci ng safer i nvest me n t s and hence increasing t he
eff i ciency of  i nvest me n t   ( He l l ma n ,   Mu r dock,   and  St i gl i t z,  1996  a,b).  
We   t herefore esti ma t e t he  f ol l ow i ng  equat i on,   i n  wh i ch t he  capit al  stock  i s l agged  once 
i n  order  t o  avoi d  possibl e simu l t aneit y:
Log(Yt/ K t)   =  b0    + b1  l og  Kt-1    +  b3l og Lt+ b4 l og  FDt+ b5Rt+b6  I RRt  +  εt ( 5)
Wh e r e t he dependent   vari able i s t he l ogari t hm  of  t he r ati o of  out put   ( Y)   t o t he capit al 
stock  ( K) .   L  r epresents em ploym ent ,   FD  i s an i ndi cator  of  banki ng  sector  devel opm ent ,  
R  i s t he  r eal  i nt erest  r ate and  I RR  are i nt erest  r ate r estr aint s.
Equat i on (5) has a useful  int erpretati on i n t hat  it  expl ains t he average product i vi t y of 
capit al,  wh i ch is the focus of mu c h  o f  the l i t erature on fi nanci al devel opm ent  and 
grow t h ( Ar esti s and De me t r i ades,  1997).   Thi s i s also w hy t he f i nanci al  sector  vari ables 
have a nat ural  i nt erpretati on  as t he  det ermi nant s of  t he  product i vi t y  of  t he  capit al  stock.  
I t  is, aft er all ,  the fi nanci al sector that  largel y det ermi nes w hat  ki nds of invest me n t  
proj ects are f i nanced.   We   also cont r ol   f or  t he  i nfl uence  of  t he  capit al  and  l abour  i nput s; 
not e that  t he coeff i cient of t he capit al stock i s expected to be negat i ve,  assum ing
di mi ni shing r eturns t o capit al.
Da t a
W e m easure the average product i vi t y of capit al by t he rati o of the fl ow  of curr ent 
out put  to t he capit al stock.  Da t a on t he capit al stock for the peri od 1963-1990 we r e 
obt ained f r om  t he Wo r l d Bank Da t abase com pil ed by Ne h r u et  al  ( 1993).   Ca pi t al  stock 
f i gures f r om  1991 t o 1997 we r e const r uct ed f ol l ow i ng t he perpet ual   i nvent ory me t hod 
assum ing a depreciati on r ate of  4%  and uprati ng t he pri ce of  capit al   goods i n l i ne wi t h 
t he G D P defl ator.  I nvest me n t  and G D P dat a w ere obt ained fr om Int ernati onal
Fi nanci al   St at i sti cs ( CD- ROM ,   1998: 6).   Da t a on em ploym ent   we r e obt ained f r om  t he 
UN,  St at i sti cal yearbook f or Asi a and t he Paci f i c (vari ous i ssues).  R eal int erest  r ates 16
we r e m easured by  t he  general  l endi ng  r ate mi nus  t he  curr ent  i nfl ati on  r ate.  The  dat a on 
i nt erest  r ates we r e coll ected f r om  t he Bank of  Ko r ea,  A nnual   Report s ( vari ous i ssues).  
The  i nt erest  r ate r estr aint   i ndex i s defi ned as i n t he previous secti on and i s const r uct ed 
usi ng dat a coll ected fr om  Bank of Ko r ea, A nnual  Report s (vari ous i ssues).  Fi nal l y,  
f i nanci al devel opm ent  is m easured by t he rati o of nom i nal  broad cl aim s on pri vat e 
sector  t o nom i nal   GDP.   The  dat a f or  t hese vari ables we r e obt ained f r om  Int ernat i onal
Fi nanci al   St at i sti cs (C D -R O M ,  1998: 6).
Empi rical  Res ul t s
Tabl e 3  r eport s t he  esti ma t ed l ong-run  coint egrati ng  vector  f or  t he  average product i vi t y 
of  capit al.   Thr ee di f f erent  specif i cati ons are r eport ed,  dependi ng wh e t her  we   i ncl ude a 
m easure of  unproduct i ve credit   or  not .     M odel   A  i ncl udes onl y a m easure of  f i nanci al 
devel opm ent  wh i l e M odel  B i ncl udes al so a m easure of ' unproduct i ve'   c r edit ,
m easured by t he rati o of excess suppl y of credit  t o t ot al broad cl aims .  M odel  C
excludes t he r eal  i nt erest  r ate,  as t hi s wa s   f ound t o be i nsi gni f i cant  i n t he t wo   previous 
specif i cati ons.
Al l   t he vari ables are signi f i cant  except  f or  t he r eal  i nt erest  r ate.  The  i mp l i ed elasti cit y 
of  t he capit al  stock r anges f r om  0. 42 t o 0. 47,   wh i ch i s a pl ausibl e r ange.   The  elasti cit y 
of labour ranges fr om  0. 53 t o 0. 67,  wh i ch is also in a reasonabl e range.   In al l  three 
m odel s, t he fi nanci al devel opm ent  i ndi cator enters signi f i cantl y w i t h t he expect ed
posi t i ve si gn.  I nt eresti ngl y,  t he rati o of excess credit  t o broad cl aims  e n t ers
signi f i cantl y wi t h a negat i ve sign.   Thi s f i ndi ng str engt hens t he vi ew  t hat   t he esti ma t ed 
excess credit   coul d be i nt erpreted as ' unproduct i ve' .   Fi nal l y,   i nt erest  r ate cont r ol s enter 
signi f i cantl y  wi t h  a negat i ve  sign  i n  bot h  m odel s B  and  C.   Thi s r esult   i ndi cates t hat   t he 
presence of int erest rate restr aint s m ay have al l ow ed t he fi nanci ng of unproduct i ve 
proj ects, r educi ng t he eff i ciency of i nvest me n t  and hence decreasing t he average
product i vi t y of  capit al.   Al l   t hree m odel s perf orm  we l l   as r efl ected i n t he hi gh R
2;   t hey 
also pass vari ous di agnost i c tests, except for m odel  A wh e r e the nul l  hypot hesi s of
norma l i t y i s r ejected.  Fi nal l y,   accordi ng t o t he A ugm ent ed Di ckey Ful l er  stati sti cs,  t he 
hypot hesi s of a uni t  root  is rejected at the 5 %  l evel,  indi cati ng t hat  these est i ma t ed 
m odel s f orm  coint egrati ng  vectors.
Sources  of   TFP  growt h
Tabl e 4 decom poses out put  grow t h i nt o i t s vari ous sources, usi ng t he est i ma t ed
coeff i cients of  M odel   C  ( Tabl e 3).     I n l i ne wi t h ot her  studi es on t he sources of  grow t h 
i n East  As i a (Y oung,  1993;  Bos wor t h et  al,  1995;  IMF ,  1998),  we  f i nd t hat  t he
dom i nant   f actor  cont r i but i ng  t o  grow t h  wa s   capit al  accum ulati on.     On   average,  over  t he 
peri od 1966-96,  the cont r i but i on of the capit al stock t o econom i c grow t h w as 5. 29 
percentage point s, wh i l e labour cont r i but ed 2.05 per cent.  A s i gni f i cant cont r i but i on17
w as m ade by t he fi nanci al system , in t hat  fi nanci al dept h w as t he m ai n factor behi nd 
TFP  grow t h,   cont r i but i ng on average 1. 18 percentage poi nt s per  annum .     On   t he ot her 
hand,   ' unproduct i ve'   credit   wa s   r esponsi bl e f or  a r educt i on i n TFP  by 0. 05 per  cent  per 
annum ,   wh i l e i nt erest  r ate l i berali sati on ma d e   a posi t i ve cont r i but i on of  0. 33 per  cent.  
Ov e r all ,   we   f i nd t hat   TFP  cont r i but ed 1. 47%  t o GDP  grow t h duri ng 1996-94,   wh i ch i s 
very cl ose t o Y oung' s (1993) esti ma t e of 1. 7% ,  and hi gher than t he 0. 7 est i ma t e of
Bos wa r t h  et  al  ( 1995).  
Tabl e  3-   Co i nt egrati ng  V ector  f or  A verage  Product i vi t y  of  Ca pi t al
1
( Sam pl e  peri od:  1963- 1996)
Re gr essors M odel   A M odel   B M odel   C







































Di agnost i c Test s
Ad j - R
2 0. 990 0. 997 0. 997
J-B9 . 719[0. 007] 2. 443[0. 294] 1. 425[0. 490]
Q( 7, 10) 3. 780[0. 876] 8. 210[0. 314] 8. 832[0. 264]
Coi nt egrati on  Test
DF - 2. 809 -2. 892 -2. 913
ADF( 1) -3. 462** -3. 565** -3. 602**
ADF( 2) -3. 594** -3. 800** -3. 806**
No t es:
(1) T he dependent   vari able i s t he  l ogari t hm   of  t he  r ati o  of  curr ent  r eal  GDP  t o  r eal  capit al  stock  l agged 
once (Y t/ Kt - 1) .   The  me t hod of  esti ma t i on i s DOLS  .   To  avoi d over - param eteri zati on we   onl y r etain 
signi f i cant  l ags  and  l eads  ( I nder  1995).   Fi gures  i n  parentheses are  adjust ed  - standard  errors.
(2) L K  denot es t he l ogari t hm  of  t he r eal  capit al  stock,   LL  i s t he l ogari t hm  of  em ploym ent ,   LFD  i s t he 
l ogari t hm  of the rati o of nom inal  broad cl aim s on pri vat e sector to nom i nal  GDP;  R i s the real
i nt erest  r ate;  I RR  i s t he  i nt erest  r ate r estr aint s;  and    EXC
B  i s t he  r ati o  of  r eal  excess suppl y  of  credit  
( esti ma t ed using t he coi nt egrati ng vect or of M odel  A- Tabl e 1) to real broad credit  wi t h  negat i ve 
val ues  r eplaced  by  zeros.  
*Si gni f i cant  at  t he  1%   l evel;   **  Si gni f i cant  at  t he  5%   l evel.18
Tabl e  4  –Sources of  Econom i c Gr o wt h:   Es t i ma t ed Co nt ribut i on  of  Ca pi t al ,   Labour  and
Tot al   Fact or  Product i vi t y
1( I n  Percent)
I nput sT o t al Factor Product i vi t y
Per i od RG K L FD I RR EXC Tot al D D R ES
1971-1975 7. 81 5. 26 2. 61 0. 00 0. 00 -0. 03 -0. 03 0. 73 -0. 77
1976-1980 6. 81 6. 06 1. 96 1. 01 0. 52 0. 03 1. 56 -2. 23 -0. 55
1981-1985 7. 77 4. 07 1. 21 0. 92 0. 13 0. 06 1. 11 1. 07 -0. 23
1986-1990 9. 55 4. 60 2. 54 0. 93 0. 65 0. 19 1. 77 0. 02 0. 60
1991-1995 7. 18 4. 76 1. 61 0. 70 0. 97 -0. 15 1. 52 -- - - -
2 - - - - -
2
1966-1994 8. 64 5. 29 2. 05 1. 18 0. 33 -0. 04 1. 47 -0. 23 0. 04
No t es:
(1) B ased  on  M odel   C,   Tabl e  3.
(2) D ue t o  l ags  and  l eads,    error t erm s  and  dynam i cs  can' t   be  averaged  usi ng  out   t he  enti r e  peri od.
(3) RG  denot es the real grow t h rate, K i s capit al stock,  L i s labour,  FD i s fi nanci al dept h,  IRR i s 
i nt erest rate restr aint s; EXC i s the excess suppl y of credit ,  D D  denot es the dynam i c term s and 
RES  i s t he  r esidual .  
The  evidence  on  t he  mo s t   r ecent  decade show s  t hat   t he  slow dow n  i n  GDP  grow t h  f r om  
9. 6%   duri ng  1986-90  t o  7. 2%   duri ng  1991-95,   l argel y  r efl ects a r educt i on  i n  t he  grow t h 
of  em ploym ent   f r om  2. 54 t o 1. 61 and a f all   i n TFP  f r om  1. 77%  t o 1. 52% .     The  f all   i n 
TFP can be att r i but ed almo s t  enti r ely t o a sl ow dow n i n fi nanci al devel opm ent  fr om  
0. 93%  t o 0. 70% .  Fur t hermo r e, 'unproduct i ve'  credit  seem s to have cont r i but ed to t he 
slow dow n  of  TFP  duri ng  t he  f i r st  hal f   of  t he  1990s.
The r esult s of t hi s secti on w arn against  an over-simp l i f i cati on of our f i ndi ng
concerni ng unproduct i ve credit .     Specif i call y,   i n spit e of  t he presence of  unproduct i ve 
credit ,  the banki ng system ' s cont r i but i on t o T FP w as signi f i cantl y posi t i ve duri ng t he 
l ast  t hree decades,  alt hough  TFP  ma y   have  been som ew hat  hi gher  had  t he  proport i on  of 
' unproduct i ve'  credit  to t ot al credit  been sm all er.   T his is, of course, easier said t han 
done,  especiall y for a system  that  wa s  f i nanci ng excepti onal l y hi gh rates of capit al 
accum ulati on i n a r apidl y grow i ng econom y.     I t   ma y ,   t herefore,  be argued t hat   at  l east 
t o som e ext ent ' unproduct i ve credit '  m ay have been an unavoi dabl e side eff ect of the 
pol i cies t hat   support ed r apid  r ates of  capit al  accum ulati on  and  grow t h  of  t he  past .
4.   Co nc l udi ng  Re ma r ks
The em pir i cal analysi s presented in t hi s paper r eveals an underl yi ng st r uct ural
w eakness i n t he K orean fi nanci al system , in t he form o f  persistent excess credit .  Ou r  
em pir i cal analysi s of TFP gr ow t h confi r ms  t hat  the est i ma t ed excess credit  coul d be 19
i nt erpreted as ' unproduct i ve' ,  indi cati ng t hat  a sizeable proport i on of tot al credit  wa s  
used t o r efi nance unprofi t able proj ects and cash short f all s.  Ou r   f i ndi ngs are,  t herefore, 
consi stent  wi t h t he hypot heses of  ' overl endi ng'   and ' overi nvest me n t ' ,   wh i ch ma y   r efl ect 
soft   budget   const r aint s and/or  mo r al  hazard  ( H uang  and  Xu ,   1999;   Cor sett i   et  al,   1999).
We   have  argued,   how ever,   t hat   unproduct i ve  credit   ma y   we l l   have  been an unavoi dabl e 
side  eff ect  of  pol i cies t hat   support ed r apid  r ates of  capit al  accum ulati on  and  grow t h  and 
t hat  it  w as not  by i t self  responsi bl e for the fi nanci al cri sis.  In t he 1980s t he K orean 
governm ent   wa s   able t o  avert   a banki ng  cri sis i n  spit e of  t he  presence of  a l arge  vol um e 
of non-perf ormi ng debt   by i nfl ati ng i t s wa y   out   of  t he probl em  - essenti all y by pri nt i ng 
m oney.Thi s wa s   no l onger  possibl e by t he mi d-1990s because t he bul k of  short -term
l i abil i t i es in t he banki ng system  w ere in foreign curr ency w hil e int ernat i onal  reserves 
t hat  coul d provi de cover for them  w ere very l ow .   C om bined w i t h w eaknesses i n t he 
m anagem ent  of f i nanci al r i sks and lax prudent i al r egul ati on,  t hi s provi ded fert i l e
ground for fi nanci al pani c
8.   Wh e n   t he cri sis erupt ed,  t he coll apse of  t he exchange r ate 
and  t he  hi gher  i nt erest  r ates used  t o  defend  t he  curr ency ensured t hat   i t s m agni t ude  wa s  
out   of   proport i on  t o  any  underl yi ng  str uct ural  w eaknesses. 
Fi nal l y,  our em pir i cal analysi s of t he K orean fi nanci al cri sis has an int eresti ng
i mp l i cati on for the earl i er li t erature on fi nanci al repression.   ' Fi nanci al repression'  in 
Ko r ea r esult ed i n oversuppl y of credit  and overi nvest me n t ,  inst ead of credit  rati oni ng 
and  underi nvest me n t   predicted by  t hat   l i t erature. 
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